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Euromissiles, Peace Activism, and the Transformation of the Political
Abstract: This article explores the transformation of political thought in the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) of West Germany in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Placing this story in its sociocultural context, such as the controver-
sies over the deployment of additional nuclear missiles in Europe, this arti-
cle tracks down how party members and sympathizers renegotiated their un-
derstanding of the political. In doing so, it pays particular attention to the in-
volvement of Social Democrats in the extra-parliamentary peace movement. 
It surveys the contemporary talk about the need to increase political partici-
pation of citizens, showing how Social Democrats aimed to democratize the 
political system of West Germany and their own party structures, as well as 
how this contributed to the popular anti-institutionalism of these years. The 
article also reveals the limits of the SPD’s erosion as strong forces in the par-
ty insisted on a more traditional understanding of the political. Finally, this 
article suggests foregrounding the early 1980s in Social Democratic history.
Keywords: Social Democratic Party of West Germany (SPD), Euromissile 
question, understanding of the political, participation, anti-institutionalism, 
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Introduction
In late March 1979, the nuclear meltdown in the Three Miles Island Nuclear Gene-
rating Station in Pennsylvania fueled societal anxieties of nuclear apocalypse.1 A few 
months later, the NATO dual-track decision of December 12, 1979, and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, drove East–West tensions to a peak, 
leading the 1970s’ policies of détente into crisis.2 Between 1979 and 1983, millions 
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of people across the Western world mobilized in mass protests, articulating fears 
of impending nuclear war.3 In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the “peace 
movement” against the deployment of “Euromissiles”, which built on the ecologi-
cal movement of the previous decade, was swelling like a wave.4 The Green Party, 
officially founded in 1979, came as a decisive political materialization of new protest 
concerns.5 From anti-nuclear sentiments to the emergence of non-traditional social 
movements, 1979 clearly set the stage for today. Connected to that, 1979 also marks 
the beginning of the end of the old Social Democratic world in West Germany. 
In this article, I will provide reasons for the assertion that the late 1970s and 
early 1980s saw the erosion of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in West Germany 
as it had been known since the 1950s and 1960s. What does this mean? Until the 
1970s, the SPD had aligned itself closely with the principles of representative demo-
cracy in West Germany, as well as with social market economy and the “community 
of Western values.” This process reached its climax6 when the party adopted a new 
basic program in 19597 and gave endorsement to NATO in 1960.8 Prior to the first 
oil price shock in 1973/74, the SPD was a politically and economically self-confi-
dent party, affirmatively conceiving itself as an integral part of the German post-war 
order. In the course of the 1970s, however, such convictions became increasingly fra-
gile. The world of the old social democracy perished and new uncertainties emer-
ged.9 Noteworthy elements are the destruction of the belief in nuclear energy, the 
erosion of the binary Cold War order that was losing legitimacy in vast segments of 
Western societies, the questioning of the global economic order, which came under 
intense scrutiny from people gathering in “third world movements”, and the exami-
nation of representative democracy by extra-parliamentary movements advocating 
bottom-up decision-making. I focus here on the last crisis, the renegotiation of the 
political order, which is an appropriate case study for analyzing the erosion of the 
SPD, since it served as a proxy debate for Social Democratic identity policies.10
The SPD’s erosion came from the interplay between extra-party protest and 
inner-party conflicts. The tension between movement and party was already set in 
motion when ecological action groups assumed prominence in the 1970s, but it took 
on a new quality in the early 1980s as an increasing number of Social Democrats 
questioned the meaningfulness and functioning of political institutions. I under-
stand social democracy not primarily in terms of a political party with fixed hie-
rarchies and political routines, but as a social milieu stretching well beyond for-
mal party affiliation. For my purpose, Social Democrats serve as a kind of orbi-
ter for exploring the fluid fault line between the establishment and social activism. 
My object under investigation is a particularly complex one, since the fault line ran 
directly through social democracy itself: many young and female members of the 
party sympathized with the dissenters and actively engaged in the protest.
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Other political parties in Western European states also had to compromise due 
to divergent inner-party standpoints and newly emerging social movements. How-
ever, nowhere was this process as intense and nowhere did it have such grave conse-
quences as in West Germany. In Great Britain, to begin with, the Labour Party pro-
ved to be remarkably united in opposing the missiles.11 This was due to long-stan-
ding traditions of anti-nuclear protests in the country and partly due to the fact 
that Labour had lost power to Thatcher in 1979. As there had been strong bonds 
between the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Labour since the late 1950s, 
the controversies over the Euromissiles witnessed an almost unquestioned alliance 
between the movement and the party. The Dutch Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) shared 
similarities with both the SPD and the Labour Party. Like the SPD, the PvdA only 
began its opposition in 1982, but like Labour, it had fought against the deployment 
since the conflict took shape.12 The reasons lay in the political climate in the Nether-
lands, where the anti-nuclear consensus was so high that even members of the royal 
family endorsed the peace movement. Moreover, in 1979, the Dutch parliament 
vetoed the dual-track decision. Against the background of this political climate, and 
with nuclear fears settling down in many European societies, it is remarkable that 
France remained largely untouched by protests. There was a widespread pro-nuclear 
consensus in the country, and even the socialists of President François Mitterrand’s 
party were strongly in favor of the deployment.13 This had to do with national pride 
in the French nuclear program and with fears of renewed German strength. In short, 
the SPD’s situation in the early 1980s was unique in Western Europe.
Based on original archival research, I advance the argument that the Euromis-
sile question effectively worked as a catalyst for an inner-party renegotiation over 
core issues, among them, most importantly, the SPD’s understanding of the politi-
cal. By studying the examination of the political in the SPD, my article enters new 
historiographical terrain.14 Following the so-called “Bielefeld approach,” I conceive 
“the political” in a constructivist way “as a communicative sphere that is subject to 
substantial variation in space and time.”15 These variations are brought about by acts 
of verbal, visual, and performative communication. Operationalizing this Bielefeld 
approach allows us to historicize the comprehension of the political itself and to 
reveal this contested concept as contingent and hence reversible. 
The article is arranged in three parts. First, I trace the cases of inner-party fraud 
in a systematic manner (“Anatomy of a Crisis”). Second, I address the party rela-
tions regarding the peace movement in greater detail (“The Blurring of Bounda-
ries”). Third, and building on this, I examine the renegotiation of the understanding 
of the political in the SPD (“Rethinking the Understanding of the Political”). Finally, 
I synopsize the SPD’s socio-cultural transformation and its limits in the 1980s.
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Anatomy of a Crisis
In simplified terms, two types of Social Democrats clashed in the conflict over the 
Euromissiles. On one hand, the SPD figures who criticized the deployment and con-
tributed to the peace movement were young and female. They defined their place on 
the left of the SPD and came from the party’s lower rungs and margins. On the other 
hand, the majority of the Social Democrats who supported the dual-track decision 
were male and older than the protesters; consequently, they took positions that were 
more conservative. Both types of Social Democrats used different styles of commu-
nication, which fueled the inner-party conflict.
As a point of departure, for the Social Democrats, the controversies over the 
Euromissiles ran along a vertical opposition between the party elites and the grass-
roots. At least at the beginning of the debates, in 1979–81, condemnation of the 
deployment was driven from below by the fundamental constituents of the party. 
Numerous motions were passed by regional party conventions, appeals were draf-
ted by local SPD groups, and letters were written by individual party members, all of 
which substantiate this claim. Examples include a letter from the local SPD chapter 
Vaterstetten, a small town in Bavaria, to the party headquarters in Bonn.16 In this let-
ter, party activists tried to push the leadership to collaborate with peace groups and, 
in so doing, to make sure that no missiles would be deployed in West Germany.17 It 
is essential to note that by 1980, many local groups of the SPD regarded themselves 
as an integral part of the peace movement.18 Thus, the distinction between “the SPD” 
and “the peace movement” does not work at the grassroots. This mirrored what had 
happened in local SPD chapters when they discussed the atomic power plants after 
1975. The centers of opposition were the German states of Baden-Württemberg, 
Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein, in general, and the party districts of Hesse South, 
Middle Rhine, and Bremen, among many others.19 On the contrary, the leadership’s 
course followed the logic sketched out by NATO: after the SPD’s federal convention 
of 1979 had officially decided to support NATO’s dual-track move, which offered the 
Warsaw Pact mutual arms reductions and threatened that, in the event of disagree-
ment, NATO would deploy more missiles in Western Europe, party officials reques-
ted that the SPD delay its internal conflict and await the outcome of the 1983 nego-
tiations.20 This logic was of little significance for many people at the grassroots; here, 
federal party conventions seemed quite distant.21 They dreaded a nuclear war that 
would result in their deaths and the devastation of Europe. This interpretation  – 
that the deployment of nuclear missiles would increase the likelihood of nuclear 
death  – profoundly structured their outlook on international relations and inter-
fered with the party elite’s reasoning.22 Certainly, some of the SPD leaders also felt 
uneasy about the dual-track decision and the Euromissiles. The party chairperson 
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Willy Brandt and his close ally Egon Bahr, among others, voiced skepticism in pri-
vate conversations early on.23 With regard to their public statements, however, one 
needs to read between the lines to find traces of doubt.24 In the minutes of the party’s 
executive board, critical voices emerged only after the SPD lost power in Septem-
ber 1982.25 The reasons are easily deciphered, since the party elites felt pressured to 
support the political course of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a Social Democrat who 
was among the most fervent supporters of NATO’s policies.26 Having established this 
much, analysis of the controversies of the SPD as a conflict between the party elites 
and the grassroots requires demonstration of the temporal change. Resistance incre-
asingly spread from the grassroots to higher levels in the SPD, and after September 
1982, it began to impact on the SPD as a whole. 
Second, cases of the inner-party fraud followed a horizontal opposition between 
the left and the right. Many critics of deployment considered themselves part of 
the left-leaning political terrain in the SPD. They participated in the meetings and 
activities of the Frankfurter Kreis, an influential circle of the SPD left. However, the 
most fervent supporters of the dual-track decision came from the party’s right wing, 
the Godesberger Kreis.27 Membership numbers of these informal and loose networks 
were rather limited – roughly, the Frankfurter Kreis was three times larger than the 
Godesberger Kreis – but both networks had numerous informal supporters in the 
SPD.28 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the leader of the SPD in Baden-Württem-
berg, Erhard Eppler, were the two Social Democrats who best embodied these fac-
tions. While Schmidt, throughout his political career, was a proponent of the SPD’s 
right wing and, in the 1980s, a staunch supporter of the dual-track move, Eppler had 
a reputation as a leftist Social Democrat and, in the controversies over the Euromis-
siles, as Schmidt’s most fervent opponent.29 If the inner-party battle zones paralleled 
the left–right distinction, this had implications for the argumentative reasoning pat-
terns they used in the discussions. On the one side, the party’s supporters of the 
dual-track decision argued from within the logic of established security policies. For 
them, the Soviet Union was the ideological enemy and the Harmel strategy of both 
deterrence and dialogue was vital in approaching the Warsaw Pact. In their reading, 
nuclear weapons were indispensable for Western security.30 On the other side, the 
SPD’s left argued for the relaxation of enemy stereotypes and for alternative security 
conceptions.31 Compared to the Godesberger Kreis, the Frankfurter Kreis was more 
open to collaboration with the greens. Exploring the Euromissile question in the 
SPD as a contested issue between left and right also helps to explain why regional 
chapters such as Middle Rhine and Hesse South, which traditionally stood on the 
left of the SPD’s political spectrum, opposed the deployment.32 With the left being 
much closer to distancing themselves from NATO’s policies, the regional chapters of 
the SPD – like Western Westphalia, which leaned to the more conservative side of 
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the SPD party spectrum – were more supportive of the dual-track decision.33 How-
ever, this explanation only works for the early phase of the debates. As the broa-
der resistance against NATO’s plans grew among Social Democrats, the party’s right 
wing quickly became agitated by the anti-nuclear sentiment. This probably explains 
why in 1983 even such well-known figures as party executive manager Peter Glotz or 
the prime minister of North Rhine Westphalia Johannes Rau, who were exponents 
of the Godesberger Kreis, advocated for the strategic coalition between social demo-
cracy and the peace groups.34
A third division within social democracy ran along generational lines. At the 
beginning of the controversies, it was the party’s youth who voiced criticism of the 
deployment. In a paper published in the leftist newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau, by 
1978, young socialists were calling on the party leadership to renounce any deploy-
ment of new weapons in Germany.35 They linked the financial means necessary for 
the production of those weapons to the allegedly underfunded welfare state and to 
development aid. This was a common pattern used by Social Democratic critics of 
the dual-track decision.36 The fact that the party’s youth demonized the Euromissiles 
at the very moment that the public debate took shape comes as no surprise, since the 
SPD membership had transformed in the course of the student protest movement of 
1968. In particular, younger people had begun to flood the party in the early 1970s 
when Willy Brandt was chancellor.37 As a relatively young and charismatic politician 
who advocated political reform and societal liberalization, he attracted thousands of 
students, pupils, and apprentices. These new members brought with them the stu-
dent movement’s intellectual background. Dietmar Süss describes how they set in 
motion a profound transformation of the tradition-rich party and its socialization 
practices.38 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, they had lost their radicalism. 
Similarly, their membership numbers decreased from 103,000 in 1976 to 52,000 in 
1982.39 Compared to the overall number of SPD party members in 1982, this meant 
that in 1982 the young socialists comprised one quarter of all SPD members, but this 
quarter was still eager to disagree with the party elite.40
Fourth, the inner-party fraud displayed a gender clash since women in the SPD, 
in comparison with their male fellow party members, were much more likely to 
oppose the deployment. Comparable to young socialists, the association for women 
in the SPD took a critical stance against nuclear weapons remarkably early in the 
evolution of the conflict. In 1979, they condemned the deployment of the Euro-
missiles by aligning themselves with minorities in the global south and by pointing 
to their own discrimination in society.41 They held that it was because of their own 
exclusion from full political and social participation throughout the centuries that 
they were capable of realizing the necessity of disarmament.42 Women in the SPD – 
approximately 23 percent of the party membership were female in 1980 – used femi-
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nist frames of reference to counter the missile deployment.43 For them, war was the 
outcome of male aggression, overestimation, and hubris. They imagined women as 
peaceful, reconciliatory, and understanding.44 Arguing against the missile deploy-
ment, therefore, meant further advancing the feminist cause.45 While women in the 
SPD had mostly fought for emancipation in areas assigned to them by men, such as 
female professions or abortion policies, they now turned to a traditionally mascu-
line-coded issue.46 International relations along with security policies, they argued, 
were no longer to be organized according to the traditional schemes of victory and 
defeat or strength and weakness.47 They advocated for the abandonment of enemy 
stereotypes and the implementation of peace education in schools in order to facili-
tate harmony between people.48
Fifth, the conflict over the Euromissiles was driven by the fact that Social Demo-
crats favored different communicational styles. This was the result of the socio-
cultural transformation through new (young and female) members. Anti-nuclear 
protesters shared with other peace activists a discursive repertoire based on plain 
speaking, authenticity, individualization, and, most importantly, emotionalization, 
which departed significantly from the more conventional style that supporters of the 
dual-track logic preferred.49 Not only were fears of nuclear war a common language 
inside and outside the SPD, they also summed up the collective doomsday mood 
that became the signum of the age.50 Eckart Conze rightly argues that this apocalyp-
tic sentiment was part of a widespread criticism of modernity and technological pro-
gress that came over Western societies in the 1970s and 1980s.51 Nuclear fears, how-
ever, were older than this. In 1955, philosopher Bertrand Russell issued a manifesto 
highlighting the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and in West Germany, promi-
nent scientists, among them Otto Hahn and Werner Heisenberg, denounced the 
government’s plans to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons in 1957.52 Such 
anti-nuclear fears led to the “Struggle Against Atomic Death” movement that, sup-
ported by Social Democrats and trade unionists, politicized Western Germany in 
the late 1950s.53 These anxieties were refreshed in the 1970s when ecological move-
ments began to raise doubts about the safety of atomic power plants.54 They reached 
their climax when NATO decided to deploy a new generation of nuclear missiles in 
Europe. Consequently, collective worries haunted peace activists within and beyond 
the SPD and led them to develop on a very specific style of communication. While 
Chancellor Schmidt described himself as a rational and pragmatic statesman capa-
ble of bringing the superpowers back to the negotiation table, the peace activists in 
the SPD denied that these policies were sane.55 They outplayed the self-stylization of 
Schmidt, thus replacing rationalization with emotionalization and authenticity. To 
cite one paradigmatic source, a female Social Democratic activist wrote in a letter to 
the party headquarters: 
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Have you ever bent over the bed of a sleeping child? Have you ever felt those 
two little arms that tenderly twine around your neck? Don’t you have any 
memories of your mom’s or dad’s tenderness? Have you ever been in love 
with another person and were trembling for his or her life? Think of any of 
those persons and re-start the process of being human again. Cease your war-
mongering security and defense projects, and join those who, like me, want 
to live without being afraid all the time.56
People supporting the extra-parliamentary movement judged the policies regarding 
balance and equilibrium as divorced from reality. They built on theories presented 
by psychoanalyst Horst-Eberhard Richter, who argued that emphatically confessing 
fears was the precondition to getting rid of them.57 With the help of psychoanalytic 
techniques, peace activists expected that being alarmed was a survival tactic in the 
advanced nuclear age.58 Emotionalization and authenticity appeared to them to be 
both an act of individual liberation and a modus of insight that would help transcend 
established security policies and finally overcome the Cold War’s binary order.59 
However, the adversaries of the policies of balance and nuclear deterrence not only 
expressed their anxieties and fears over nuclear death, but also advanced a number 
of ideas on how to make deployment dispensable. These ideas ranged from highly 
detailed proposals for the superpower negotiations in Geneva, such as the reduction 
of force levels, missile flight ranges, or nuclear warheads, to broader conceptions 
intended to replace the existing military strategies. For instance, the “civilian (or 
social) defense” approach, developed by German philosopher Theodor Ebert, sug-
gested non-violent actions like resistance and disobedience as means of defense.60 
More importantly for Social Democrats, the “non-offensive offensive” approach, 
put forward by former FRG minister Andreas von Bülow, proposed redesigning the 
Bundeswehr so that it would appear incapable of mounting assaults.61
Assuming that the inner-party controversies ran along four dividing but inter-
secting lines (gender and age, horizontal and vertical opposition) and utilized a par-
ticular stylistic repertoire, it is necessary to stress that this systematization of the 
inner-party fault line underemphasizes temporal change, since the number of oppo-
nents constantly increased. In the end, the anti-nuclear sentiment was the common 
position in the SPD, and social democracy had turned upside-down. It is, therefore, 
crucial to explore in depth the blurring of the line between party and society by loo-
king more closely, and from a chronological perspective, at the inner-party rebels’ 
triumphant march.
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The Blurring of Boundaries
Between 1979 and 1983, the line between the establishment and extra-party acti-
vism became increasingly unstable. This was the prerequisite for the renegotiation 
of the SPD’s understanding of the political. It was at the end of 1980, around the first 
anniversary of NATO’s dual-track decision, that some left-leaning Social Demo-
crats started to doubt whether negotiations regarding the missiles would lead to a 
meaningful conclusion.62 The international context of these anxieties was the dete-
rioration of the relationship between the superpowers.63 In fact, the phase of détente 
seemed to have come to a standstill in the last years of the Carter administration. 
With the ascent to power of President Ronald Reagan, who moved into the White 
House in January 1981, the superpower relationship deteriorated further.64 Reagan 
claimed that the United States must be strong both politically and militarily. He 
allowed himself to be guided by a vivid concept of the enemy image in the form of 
the Soviet Union and harshly condemned Soviet policies. In March 1983, he even 
spoke of the Soviet Union as the evil empire. These developments on the internatio-
nal stage were the fruitful soil upon which Social Democrats raised alarm about the 
chances of an outcome to negotiations.
Among the first SPD chapters to officially question the logic of the dual-track 
decision was Baden-Württemberg under the leadership of Erhard Eppler in May 
1981.65 For the party elites in Bonn, the dissension of one of the largest party chap-
ters concerning the NATO decision was a bad sign.66 Schmidt began to recognize 
that he was losing the backing of his party.67 Things further deteriorated as a vast 
number of Social Democrats participated in the German Protestant Kirchentag in 
Hamburg in June 1981.68 By linking their Christian faith to the purpose of inter-
national reconciliation, they displayed fundamental disagreement with the poli-
cies of Schmidt and the government.69 Again, a few months later, on October 10, 
1981, thousands of Social Democrats rallied together with other peace activists on 
the Hofgartenwiese in Bonn.70 Eppler, who in the meantime was regarded a lea-
ding figure of the peace movement, gave a widely received speech to the protesters.71 
The rally of October 10, 1981, made visible to the public just how estranged Social 
Democrats had become since 1979.72 Not only did the party leadership encompass 
such adversarial politicians as Schmidt and Eppler, with Brandt standing somewhere 
in the middle, but the Social Democratic spectrum was torn apart by the involve-
ment of many local and regional SPD organizations in the movement.
In the early 1980s, the boundaries between social democracy and civil society 
became increasingly fluid. Most obviously, a significant number of SPD members 
and sympathizers participated in the activities of peace groups on the local and regi-
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onal level or sought collaboration with the Greens. They hosted house meetings 
with non-SPD peace activists from the churches or the communists to discuss the 
prospects of disarmament. They set up information tables and talked to pedestri-
ans on the streets or conducted door-to-door canvassing; they gathered signatures 
for petitions, drafted letters or appeals, and mobilized letter-writing and phone-cal-
ling to the government or the American and Soviet embassies. They helped orga-
nize large demonstrations and peace rallies and spread flyers, and they put up pos-
ters and sewed banners. There are numerous primary sources demonstrating this 
development. The activities of Social Democrats in the South German city of Stutt-
gart, for instance, are well documented.73 Among other things, these sources show 
that Social Democrats provided other peace activists with the necessary expertise to 
organize mass events.74 Political activism was at the core of what Social Democrats 
were practicing during their leisure time, but it was not something one would expect 
the general public to know. This is why practical skills and knowledge migrated from 
the party to the extra-parliamentary peace groups in the early 1980s.75 Skills and 
knowledge moved in the opposite direction, too, since many Social Democratic 
chapters at the grassroots were eager to rebuild and modernize their repertoire of 
actions.76 This is important because the peace movement, in comparison with the 
traditional non-verbal communication style of SPD members, broke fresh ground. 
For instance, activists performed “die-ins” or “human carpets” to increase awareness 
of the deadly consequences of nuclear escalation.77 These various ways of demons-
trating dissent, which were formerly unbeknown to the SPD, infiltrated the Social 
Democratic repertoire in the 1980s, thus paving the way for closer cooperation with 
political forces outside the party.78
In the summer of 1981, even Peter Glotz, the party executive manager, star-
ted to build bridges between the SPD headquarters and the movement’s coordina-
tion committee in Bonn.79 For this purpose, he hired Wolfgang Biermann, one of 
the leading peace activists in West Berlin, as a new consultant for peace and disar-
mament and as a contact person for the coordination committee.80 Biermann had 
achieved some prominence during 1980–81 when he criticized the SPD for accept-
ing the dual-track decision in 1979.81 In particular, he successfully collected signatu-
res for a petition against deployment.82 After Biermann had moved into his office in 
the summer of 1981, he tirelessly drafted memos for the party leader Brandt and for 
executive board members, advancing the rapprochement of the party and the move-
ment.83 Updating the SPD leadership about discussions in the coordination com-
mittee of the peace movement, Biermann created the impression that peace acti-
vists were avidly seeking cooperation with social democracy.84 Yet this was, unsur-
prisingly, a selective take on reality, because only those activists who were interes-
ted in cooperation aligned themselves with the Social Democratic spectrum. In fact, 
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the coordination committee comprised very different political groups, among them 
Church-related, Green, and communist factions.85 At the very least, the Greens vie-
wed greater Social Democratic involvement in the peace movement very suspi-
ciously.86 This did not stop Biermann from advocating for continued change in the 
SPD toward the positions of the peace movement.
Affiliating with peace forces in West Germany was only possible after the party’s 
loss of power in September 1982. With Schmidt gone as chancellor, the most fer-
vent supporter of the dual-track decision in the SPD had left the political stage. The 
door was now open for the Social Democrats to officially join the peace movement. 
In November of 1982, a federal SPD party conference in Kiel passed a motion urging 
the superpowers to negotiate seriously, stating that deployment would be unaccep-
table for the SPD.87 In June 1983, only a few months after the SPD’s dramatic defeat 
in the federal elections of March 1983 by Helmut Kohl (a Christian Democrat), and 
the Greens’ entry into the Bundestag, the party leadership finally recommended that 
all members should take part in the activities of the peace movement.88 This was the 
sign that even the SPD elites regarded the peace forces as associates. If the years 1981 
and 1983 both witnessed huge demonstrations with the participation of SPD mem-
bers at the Hofgartenwiese in Bonn, they differed in that the rally in 1983 obtained 
the official stamp of approval from the party headquarters.89 After Eppler’s perfor-
mance in 1981 had been highly contested in the SPD leadership, none other than the 
party chairperson Willy Brandt spoke to the protesters in 1983.90 Only a few weeks 
later, the SPD’s federal party convention in Cologne passed a motion asking for the 
extension of the negotiation deadline and proposed a “freeze” of the arms race.91 The 
Hofgarten rallies of 1981 and 1983, along with the Cologne convention of November 
1983, symbolize the metamorphosis of social democracy in the early 1980s.
Rethinking the Understanding of the Political
How can we explain this transformation? Most obviously, social change affected 
SPD members. As new social movements drew people into politics and politicized 
everyday life in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, with millions of people joi-
ning peaceful street demonstrations, the Social Democratic world was turned upside 
down. Social change also affected members of other parties in the FRG – such as the 
Christian Democrats and the Free Liberals – but since they were not that divided, 
they did not start questioning the principles of political deliberation.92 Social Demo-
crats, on the contrary, affiliated with the peace movement, and they also exami-
ned the very foundations of their own political identity. From the perspective of the 
opponents of deployment, this process led to a renegotiation of the conception of the 
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political in three distinct but interwoven steps. Even if my emphasis in what follows 
is on those actively engaged in the renegotiation, it is crucial to keep in mind that 
there were many other Social Democrats, usually among the party elites, who insis-
ted on a more traditional understanding of the political. It is also noteworthy that 
the remodeling of the concept of the political did not necessarily come with tangible 
political results in lawmaking.
First, Social Democratic opponents of the missile deployment sought to reassert 
democratic authority against the political elites. By referring to elites, they meant 
both the SPD leadership and more generally the political class of the FRG. In par-
ticular, they blamed the Bundestag for enforcing NATO’s deployment plans against 
the will of the majority.93 In a coalition with other peace activists and members of 
the Green Party, they held that the Bundestag had no right to decide against mil-
lions of people protesting in the streets.94 This became obvious as the SPD mem-
bers of parliament, like Herta Däubler-Gmelin, helped organize the so-called “par-
liament of the majority” that took place on 20 November 1983, the eve of the Bun-
destag discussion regarding the missile deployment.95 After hour-long deliberations, 
the “parliament of the majority” issued a statement saying that the Bundestag was 
not entitled to endorse deployment.96 Despite the resistance of right-wing Social 
Democrats around Schmidt and the former Minister of Defense Hans Apel, peace 
activists hurled defiance at the government and denied them the right to decide on 
matters of life and death.97 
Arguing that there was a gap between the representative majority in the Bun-
destag and the majority of the populace, Social Democrats affiliated with the peace 
movement insisted that the government and parliament, instead of supporting 
deployment, grant further participation privileges to voters.98 In a very broad sense, 
participation was understood as the engagement of citizens working together to 
address an issue of concern. This also included opening the basic law to partici-
patory decision-making, or, in a first step, allowing people to make their anti-mis-
sile voices heard at the ballot box. Together with the coordination committee of the 
peace movement, they demanded that there be a “consultative referendum” about 
the missile deployment in West Germany.99 In so doing, they became guided by an 
emphatic understanding of the political. Gerhard Schröder, at the time a leading 
young socialist, and from 1998 to 2005 federal chancellor, described street protests 
as essential for democracy because they were capable of shedding light on undesira-
ble developments.100 According to Schröder, new forms of political deliberation with 
the inclusion of a greater number of citizens were necessary to close the gap between 
legality and legitimacy. Even Horst Ehmke, the more conservative deputy chair of 
the SPD Bundestag group, admitted that there was a growing tension between the 
parliamentary and plebiscitary majorities.101 Uwe Lambinus from the party’s left 
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wing in Bavaria claimed that the SPD should fight for the decentralization of the 
German political system, giving more power to the grassroots.102 Social Democrats 
who shared no similarities with the new social movements strongly opposed those 
plans. The vice president of the Bundestag, Annemarie Renger, for instance, issued 
a warning to her fellow SPD members to remember that plebiscitary democracy 
paved the way for the rise of the Nazis.103
Incorporating more participatory elements in the constitution appeared vital to 
many observers at the time. On one hand, as Silke Mende shows, there was a vibrant 
political debate among the Greens and their supporters, who built their program at 
least partly on the demand for democractization of the political decision-making 
process.104 Participation was the catchword with which both activists and theorists 
of the peace movement translated the anti-deployment goal into a broader politi-
cal assertion.105 These theorists, on the other hand, were not necessarily SPD mem-
bers, but they often sympathized with the party. Even if they adhered to other polit-
ical movements such as the Greens, this showcases that the SPD’s renegotiation of 
the understanding of the political was not limited to the ranks of the Social Dem-
ocrats. Most noteworthy in this regard is the political thought of sociologist Bernd 
Guggenberger. Together with other scholars, among them Claus Offe, he publi-
shed widely on the limits of majoritarian democracy and the crisis of representative 
democracy.106 In a chapter of a book in 1984, they argued that the majority principle 
was the necessary but insufficient precondition of democracy.107 They declared that 
should the government no longer be able to guarantee the survival of its citizens, 
they would no longer be obliged to uphold their loyalty towards the state. Physi-
cist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who cooperated with the SPD 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had already diagnosed a failure of democracy in 
1976.108 However, in the first half of the 1980s, this renegotiation of the FRG’s politi-
cal fundaments reached its culmination. Wolfgang Huber, a well-known theologist 
and Social Democrat, wrote about the limits of state action and the duty to resist-
ance.109 Jürgen Habermas, one of Germany’s most notable philosophers, justified 
civil disobedience.110 Such ideas found their way into social democracy, where they 
reverberated around the SPD membership.111 
Participation, a key concept for Social Democrats, went all the way back to Willy 
Brandt and his well-known call “to dare more democracy.”112 In 1969, Brandt not 
only set the tone for his own coalition government with the Free Liberals but also 
boiled the zeitgeist of the late 1960s down to an essence. Daring more democracy, 
nonetheless, was an old demand of the labor movement which stemmed from its 
origins in the nineteenth century. Back then, Social Democrats advocated for libe-
ral social reforms such as workers’ and womens’ participation.113 In most SPD party 
programs, notions of democratization, participation, and liberalization played major 
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parts as political guiding principles. The Godesberg program of 1959, for instance, 
essentially centered around democratization in the economic, social, and political 
sector.114 In the Euromissile crisis, these ideas regained shape in the demand to res-
tore the true sense of democracy by allowing more people the opportunity to parti-
cipate in the political process. It is not hard to see why the demand for participation 
turned up again in the course of the Euromissile debate. As these years witnessed 
existential fears of nuclear annihilation through bad decisions by elected representa-
tives, it was only consistent for the grassroots to claim power over the political pro-
cess. This is why “participation” emerged as the keyword in many primary sources 
of the time. It was used by Social Democrats opposing the deployment of Euromis-
siles both as the catchy description for a whole semantic field and as the denotation 
of a tangible political goal.
Second, many Social Democrats who opposed the deployment contributed to 
the popular anti-institutionalism of the 1980s. In doing so, they often delegitimized 
the complex workings of mediating institutions. Not everyone in the SPD went as far 
as Alfred Emmerlich, a member of parliament, who claimed that “political parties, 
lobby groups, government and the media” “monopolize” politics.115 For a healthy 
society, it was crucial, he said, that citizens contribute to the political process in 
“local initiatives and new social movements.” Politics from the bottom up was essen-
tial to keep democracy alive, Social Democrats argued. In 1984, Jürgen Schmude, 
the former SPD Minister of the Interior, acknowledged the peace movement’s poli-
tical vitality and wished that the Bundestag could learn from it.116 Such imagina-
ries – especially drawing analogies between lively political activism at the grassroots 
and a barely movable political system at the top – were mixed with profound criti-
cism of democratic institutions. This connected the Social Democratic discourse 
with the peace movement and the Green Party, and it disconnected the anti-nuc-
lear faction in the SPD from more conservative segments of the party, such as the 
trade unionists, the Godesberger Kreis, and some regional grassroots chapters like 
Western Westphalia. As early as 1981, Erhard Eppler had suspected that the Bun-
destag was incapable of discussing what actually troubled people.117 He insinuated 
that those who were afraid of opening the political system to more participatory 
elements should not refer to the Weimar Republic, but should trust in the maturity 
of German democracy. For Eppler, the political grassroots were of greater impor-
tance. Movements from the bottom up should drive the government to execute the 
will of the majority, he wrote. Hermann Scheer, a leftist exponent, defined public 
campaigns as corrective of a defective parliamentary system.118 Horst Peter, an SPD 
member of parliament, even labeled the system of representative democracy the 
opposite of true democracy.119 By advocating referenda and plebiscites, SPD figures 
like Peter, Scheer, and Eppler aimed to democratize and pluralize politics. This anti-
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institutionalist conception of the political also had implications for the understan-
ding of social democracy as a political party.
It followed from this logic, which constitutes the third point, that the bounda-
ries between the party and society had to be destabilized. This even caused an epis-
temological crisis of the concept of “political party” in the SPD.120 Questioning sta-
tic forms of political organization has to be put into perspective in relation to the 
contemporary crisis of mass organizations.121 For numerous Social Democrats at 
the grassroots who were engaging in extra-parliamentary protests and had not yet 
left the SPD for the Greens, the idea of a political party as a model of political acti-
vism seemed increasingly outdated.122 Opponents of the missile deployment lamen-
ted over the SPD’s cumbersome structures. They saw it as a disadvantage of their 
party that it was so difficult to bring about political change.123 Instead, they preferred 
fluid forms of political action. Primary sources from these years demonstrate that 
many Social Democrats questioned the very functioning of their political party: they 
criticized the programmatic objectives and the party life of the SPD;124 they saw the 
Social Democratic organization as stuck, hardly in motion, estranged, perhaps even 
boring;125 and thus they proposed that the SPD be open to more nonbinding forms 
of political engagement.126 People wanted to get involved in single-issue movements, 
Bundestag member Karsten Voigt, believed; they did not want to commit themsel-
ves to long-term membership of a political party.127
Of course, the Schmidt faction fundamentally disagreed with such a perspec-
tive.128 However, even high-ranking SPD officials like Peter Glotz admitted that the 
party organization was somewhat fusty and dysfunctional in the face of recent socie-
tal developments. In 1982, the SPD executive manager published a book in which he 
compared the SPD to a lumbering tanker.129 He conceded frankly that the SPD was 
torn apart between “the state and new social movements.”130 On the one hand, accor-
ding to him, the SPD had traditionally aligned itself with the state and understood 
itself as some sort of “state party.”131 On the other hand, however, Social Demo-
crats felt their own party’s unattractiveness in the face of the new social movements. 
Acknowledging this dichotomy, Glotz found no other possible way out but to ask 
the people in extra-parliamentary movements to be patient with the SPD.132 His rea-
soning was deeply unsatisfactory: clearly, he shed light on the core of the SPD’s pro-
blem, but he was unable to present a solution that was acceptable to both the party 
establishment and the extra-party pressure groups.133 He tried to provide the protes-
ters with a somewhat unclear offer of integration and, at the same time, denied that 
their political ideas were viable. This move was an attempt to pacify the estranged 
SPD party, and it helped to close the ranks. However, many of the people who pro-
tested in the streets saw the Greens as the political alternative to the SPD.134 This was 
the dilemma of social democracy in those years: the large majority of its constituents 
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remained skeptical when it came to inner-party change, and the impetus for renewal 
in the SPD was very limited.
It came as no surprise that the renewed emphasis on participation in the SPD 
did not materialize in legislative efforts such as the attempt to amend the German 
basic law. Reflecting on the need to better include citizens in the decision-making 
process was part of the Social Democratic answer to the questions of extra-parlia-
mentary activism. Shortly after 1983, as the missile deployment had begun and the 
peace movement was dwindling, the demands for participation disappeared from 
SPD newspaper op-eds and party convention speeches. The draft for a new SPD 
basic program from 1986, however, again reinforced these demands.135 When the 
SPD finally passed its new basic program in 1989, they asserted that politics “was 
not limited to the institutions of the state.”136 Departing from a Hegelian under-
standing of the state, the program argued that the state was not mind objectified 
but rested on the consent of the governed. This thought stood in the tradition of 
the Anglo-American history of political thought, according to which the political 
order should serve society’s needs. Political parties, Social Democrats held in 1989, 
were the mediators between society and the state, since they were supposed to trans-
late the social movement’s demands into legislation. Proposing more forms of direct 
involvement of citizens, such as a more effective system of petitions, the program 
even spoke of “democracy as a way of life.”137 Although these ideas mainly reflected 
what was already common sense in the FRG’s political debate, they still bore witness 
to the fact that the SPD had been changing in the years around and after 1983 – as 
had society as a whole.
Conclusion
While German Social Democrats after 1979 struggled over their positioning towards 
the deployment of the Euromissiles, they did not only discuss security policy issues 
or international relations. Their conflict was the starting point of a profound rene-
gotiation of the party’s identity. The emergence and rise of the peace movement, 
together with the entry of the greens in the Bundestag, were the driving forces in 
this process, which resulted in a pluralization of voices in the SPD. Extra-party and, 
to some extent, anti-party protests challenged social democracy and led some party 
factions to reformulate their mental maps. In so doing, they sought to connect with 
discourses in the peace movement. Participation is the keyword in many contem-
porary sources. Social Democrats who opposed the missile deployment aimed to 
democratize both the representative political system of the FRG and their own party 
structures. Some leftist party speakers even contributed to the popular anti-instituti-
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onalism of the 1980s. They denied that the Bundestag was the legitimate and appro-
priate institution in which to discuss and decide about the Euromissiles. They pre-
ferred bottom-up decision-making and action at the local level. Not surprisingly, 
this generated an epistemological crisis of the concept of the “political party” within 
the SPD. When Social Democrats complained about traditional SPD structures, they 
often considered extra-party movements more natural and spontaneous than their 
own party. Consequently, they encouraged political conversation in the SPD. They 
also transformed the self-understanding of the party itself.
Synopsizing this transformation, however, entails assessing the limits of change. 
It is obvious here that strong forces within the SPD insisted on the traditional under-
standing of the political, with representative democracy and vertical party hierar-
chies as core elements. Consequently, the outcome of the renegotiation of the poli-
tical was ambivalent. Social Democrats who aligned themselves with the peace 
movement often advocated revolution within the SPD, but the party leadership and 
numerous SPD members from the trade unions and other more conservative ter-
rains delayed change. The result, in the end, was a fractured SPD, lumping together 
disparate political projects. This process surfaces as the sign of a long-term sociocul-
tural and political erosion of social democracy in West Germany in the last third of 
the twentieth century. While it is clearly an exaggeration to interpret the early 1980s 
as the time when the SPD as we knew it from the 1950s and 1960s came to an end, it 
makes sense to conceive of these years as the time when social democracy plunged 
into a profound crisis. The SPD, once a powerful movement, was losing its integrati-
onal strength. Its formerly homogenous milieu splintered, with the Greens emerging 
as a new political rival. The pluralization of the party scene in the FRG is perhaps the 
manifest example of this conversion. But even the notion of a “political party” with 
its organizational and intellectual constraints seemed anachronistic to a growing 
number of party members.
Synopsizing this transformation also entails answering the question whether the 
reformulation of the understanding of the political in the SPD really was as pro-
found as this article claims. It is useful to put the claim into perspective with other 
turning points in Social Democratic history after 1945 and beyond: most impor-
tantly, 1959/60, when the SPD, by passing the Godesberg program, departed from 
conceiving itself as a class party and started to understand itself as a legitimate 
actor in the political system of the FRG (followed by 1960, when they accepted the 
country’s integration into NATO as a defense community with shared values); or 
the time around 1969 with its euphoria for daring to increase democracy. If the 
years 1979–83 may not seem that prominent when compared to 1959/60 and 1969, 
this is probably because the renegotiation of the political did not come with sub-
stantial amendments in legislation. Nevertheless, concentrating on political decisi-
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ons can lead to disregarding the actors’ intellectual setting. Through this analysis of 
these transforming perceptions and representations of the political, it becomes clear 
that the time between 1979 and 1983 was indeed a decisive phase of metamorpho-
sis for German social democracy. Therefore, I suggest foregrounding the early 1980s 
in Social Democratic history. My argument, in a nutshell, is that changing attitudes 
towards the political process and the institutional system implicitly affected the ways 
Social Democrats weighed in on other political issues. These changes were subtle 
and indeed hard to measure. But if that is true, it may be adequate to speak of a triad 
of points of consolidation in which the Social Democratic understanding of the poli-
tical changed or in which change became manifest: 1959/60–1969–1979/83. Histo-
rical accounts of the Social Democratic history should place more emphasis on the 
transformation of the 1980s.
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